18.28
Raden Rahmad
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# 10,368
The recent spate of MERS cases emanating from the Riyadh region continues, with the 7th case reported in the last 9 days from the capital city. Today the Saudi MOH reports on a 67 year old Saudi male listed in critical condition, with (as yet) no risk exposure identified.
17.55Raden RahmadNo comments
# 10,367
The chart above shows not only the magnitude, but the abrupt change of pace, of the past 8 month’s H5N1 activity. Egypt alone has reported roughly 180 cases- which dwarfs anything we’ve seen previously. This chart also illustrates the seasonality of H5N1, with distinct summer troughs reported every year.
This time of year, avian flu activity is at its nadir in the Northern Hemisphere. But just as American and European officials are anticipating the return of H5N8/H5N2 to via migratory birds this fall, Egypt is girding for another round of H5N1 this winter.
The most recent WHO Influenza at the Human-Animal Interface report - dated July 17th, but published in the past 24 hours – indicates only two new H5N1 cases were reported by Egyptian authorities in the past 30 days – plus China reported a single H5N6 (fatal) infection. .
Summary and assessment as of 17 July 2015
Human infection with avian influenza A(H5) viruses
From 2003 through 17 July 2015, 844 laboratory-confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection have been officially reported to WHO from 16 countries. Of these cases, 449 have died. Since the last WHO Influenza update on 23 June 2015, two new fatal laboratory-confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection were reported to WHO from Egypt. A 40-year-old male from Sohag governorate had an onset of illness on 14 June, was hospitalized on 16 June, but passed away on 22 June 2015. The likely source of exposure to the virus for this case was either direct exposure to poultry or indirect exposure via a contaminated environment. A five and a half-year-old male from Aswan governorate, with illness onset on 16 June was hospitalized on 24 June, but passed away on 27 June 2015. This case had a history of exposure to poultry. Both cases were given oseltamivir one day after hospitalization.
In addition, one laboratory-confirmed human case of avian influenza A(H5N6) virus infection was reported to WHO from China. A 37-year-old female from Yunnan province had an onset of illness on 6 July, was hospitalized on 9 July, but passed away on 10 July. There was no evidence of human-to-human transmission of this virus among the close contacts of this case.
Various influenza A(H5) subtypes, such as influenza A(H5N1), A(H5N2), A(H5N3), A(H5N6) and A(H5N8), continue to be detected in birds in West Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, according to reports received by OIE. Although these influenza A(H5) viruses might have the potential to cause disease in humans, so far no human cases of infection have been reported, with exception of the human infections with influenza A(H5N1) viruses and the four human infections with influenza A(H5N6) virus detected in China since 2014.
Overall public health risk assessment for avian influenza A(H5) viruses: Whenever avian influenza viruses are circulating in poultry, sporadic infections and small clusters of human cases are possible in people exposed to infected poultry or contaminated environments, therefore sporadic human cases would not be unexpected.
With the rapid spread and magnitude of avian influenza outbreaks due to existing and new influenza A(H5) viruses in poultry in areas that have not experienced this disease in animals recently, there is a need for increased vigilance in the animal and public health sectors. Community awareness of the potential dangers for human health are essential to prevent infection in humans. Surveillance should be enhanced to detect human infections if they occur and to detect early changes in transmissibility and infectivity of the viruses.
Human infections with avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses in China
A total of 677 laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses, including at least 275 deaths1, have been reported to WHO. The majority of recently reported human cases are associated with exposure to infected live poultry or contaminated environments, including markets where live poultry are sold. Influenza A(H7N9) viruses continue to be detected in poultry and their environments in the areas where human cases are occurring. There have been no major genetic changes in the viruses isolated from recent patients compared to previously-isolated viruses from humans. Information to date suggests that these viruses do not transmit easily from human to human.
Overall public health risk assessment for avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses: Overall, the public health risk from avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses has not changed since the assessment of 23 February 2015.
The WHO has also updated their latest Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2015, but the version I downloaded has some formatting problems, with the rightmost total’s column truncated.
02.11Raden RahmadNo comments
# 10,366
Up until a little over a decade ago, dogs were generally thought to be immune to influenza virus infection. In 2004, however, the equine H3N8 flu virus mutated enough to adapt to a canine host, and began to spread among greyhounds in Florida (see EID Journal article Influenza A Virus (H3N8) in Dogs with Respiratory Disease, Florida).
Since then canine H3N8 has been sporadically reported across much of the United States. It is considered a `canine specific’ virus, and there have been no reports of human infection.
But we’ve also seen evidence that other influenza viruses – including human and avian varieties – can infect canines.
As often happens, the more we look, the more we find. The expanding host range for influenza viruses (which now includes humans, equines, swine, birds, bats, camels, guinea pigs, and a variety of land and marine mammals) and the genetic diversity of influenza viruses (currently with 8 hemagglutinin & 11 neuraminidase subtypes identified), continues to surprise.
Last summer, in Study: Dogs As Potential `Mixing Vessels’ For Influenza - we looked at the ability of different influenza strains (canine, equine and human) to infect, and replicate in, canine tracheal tissues. And last February, in Virology J: Human-like H3N2 Influenza Viruses In Dogs - Guangxi, China, we looked at the discovery two H3N2 CIVs possessing high homology with human/swine influenza viruses.
While novel influenza infections among Mongolian Bactrian Camels and Peruvian guinea pigs pose fairly limited exposure risks to human populations, infection of companion animals like dogs and cats are another matter entirely.
Something that the American Society for Microbiology warned about last summer, in a press release on a study of canine influenza viruses:
Evolution of Equine Influenza Led to Canine Offshoot Which Could Mix With Human Influenza
CONTACT: Jim Sliwa
jsliwa@asmusa.org
WASHINGTON, DC – June 19, 2014 – Equine influenza viruses from the early 2000s can easily infect the respiratory tracts of dogs, while those from the 1960s are only barely able to, according to research published ahead of print in the Journal of Virology. The research also suggests that canine and human influenza viruses can mix, and generate new influenza viruses.
In this same vein, today we have a report - published in the EID Journal - detailing the discovery and isolation of Avian H6N1 in dogs in Taiwan.
H6N1 has been around for decades in Chinese poultry - it possesses similar internal genes to H5N1 and H9N2 (cite 2002 J Virol Molecular evolution of H6 influenza viruses from poultry in Southeastern China by Webster, Webby, Shortridge et al.) - and it has been speculated that it may have even been involved in the genesis of H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997.
While viewed as having some pandemic potential in the 1990s, once H5N1 emerged as a serious threat in 2003, H6N1’s threat receded back into the shadows. When Taiwan’s CDC Reported the first Human Infection With Avian H6N1 two years ago, however, interest in H6N1 quickly rose.
All of which makes H6N1 a virus of interest, and serves as prelude to today’s EID Journal article, which finds evidence of H6N1 infection in a small number of dogs sampled in Taiwan.
Influenza A(H6N1) Virus in Dogs, Taiwan
Hui-Ting Lin1, Ching-Ho Wang1, Ling-Ling Chueh, Bi-Ling Su, and Lih-Chiann Wang
Author affiliations: National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan
Abstract
We determined the prevalence of influenza A virus in dogs in Taiwan and isolated A/canine/Taiwan/E01/2014. Molecular analysis indicated that this isolate was closely related to influenza A(H6N1) viruses circulating in Taiwan and harbored the E627K substitution in the polymerase basic 2 protein, which indicated its ability to replicate in mammalian species.
Infections with influenza viruses are rare in dogs. However, interspecies transmission of an equine influenza A(H3N8) virus to dogs was identified during a respiratory disease outbreak in Florida, USA, in 2004 (1). Influenza A(H6N1) virus is the most common naturally occurring avian influenza virus in Taiwan (2). Therefore, to determine to the prevalence of influenza A virus infection in dogs in Taiwan, we performed serologic analysis, 1-step reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) screening, and virus isolation.
The Study
A total 474 serum specimens were collected in Taiwan during October 2012–October 2013. Two hundred eighty-one specimens were collected from household (owned) dogs at the National Taiwan University Veterinary Hospital in Taipei. The remaining 193 serum specimens were obtained from free-roaming dogs in rural areas.
All serum specimens were tested for antibodies against influenza A virus by using a species-independent blocking ELISA (Influenza A Virus Antibody Test Kit; Idexx, Westbrook, ME, USA). All antibody-positive serum specimens were further tested by using a hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay. HI was determined according to procedures recommended by the World Organisation for Animal Health. Chicken erythrocytes (1%) were used. Serum samples were treated with receptor-destroying enzyme (Denka Seiken, Tokyo, Japan) before conducting the assay to destroy nonspecific inhibitors (3). A/chicken/Taiwan/2838V/2000 (H6N1) and A/chicken/Taiwan/1209/03 (H5N2) viruses were used as antigens.
(SNIP)
Conclusions
Avian influenza A(H6N1) viruses have been widespread in chickens in Taiwan since 1972 (13–15). These viruses are clustered in a unique lineage that differs from viruses circulating in Hong Kong and southeastern China since 1997 (13). Unlike avian species, H6 subtype virus infections are rare in mammals.
In this study, 9 of 474 dog serum specimens were positive for influenza A virus by ELISA, and 4/185 (2.1%) dogs had RT-PCR−positive results for this virus. A/canine/Taiwan/E01/2014 was isolated from 1 dog that was co-infected with canine distemper virus. On the basis of molecular analysis of A/canine/Taiwan/E01/2014, HA, NA, PB1, PB2, NP, and NS genes showed high homology (>97% nucleotide identity) with avian H6N1 subtype virus isolates that are currently prevalent in Taiwan. PA and M genes of A/canine/Taiwan/E01/2014 showed 99% nucleotide identity with A/chicken/Taiwan/2593/2013 (H5N2).
Phylogenetic analysis showed that 8 eight virus genes were derived from H6N1 subtype viruses isolated in Taiwan. All 8 influenza virus genes found in the dog probably originated from avian sources. We speculate that a complete avian influenza virus had infected this dog. However, additional analysis is required to verify this hypothesis.
21.48Raden RahmadNo comments
#10,365
After no reports for two days, the Saudi MOH is reporting their 8th MERS case in the past 8 days. This time from Al Kharj. Details, as always, are scant.
20.16Raden RahmadNo comments
#10,364
When stories emerge about suspected links between an increased incidence of narcolepsy with taking the H1N1 Pandemrix vaccine, the elevated number of febrile reactions to CSL’s FluVax in Australia, or the possible impact of the (as-yet poorly understood) concept of Original Antigenic Sin on vaccines, it seems there is always a section of the anti-vaccine movement who will twist both the importance and meaning of these studies to fit their own agenda.
An indignity, I suspect, that yesterday’s PLoS Biology paper Imperfect Vaccination Can Enhance the Transmission of Highly Virulent Pathogens will also endure.
This immediate over-the-top `gotcha!’ response whenever researchers (or science writers) suggest that a vaccine might be less than perfect has a chilling effect, and I suspect serves as a barrier to development of better vaccines.
First, a quick look at this study – which deals with poultry vaccines for a specific herpesvirus (MDV), not human vaccines – followed by some discussion of how all this may relate to the recent proliferation of HPAI viruses around the world. The whole article is worth reading, so follow the link to read:
Research Article
Imperfect Vaccination Can Enhance the Transmission of Highly Virulent Pathogens
Andrew F. Read , Susan J. Baigent, Claire Powers, Lydia B. Kgosana, Luke Blackwell, Lorraine P. Smith, David A. Kennedy, Stephen W. Walkden-Brown, Venugopal K. Nair
Published: July 27, 2015
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1002198
Abstract
Could some vaccines drive the evolution of more virulent pathogens? Conventional wisdom is that natural selection will remove highly lethal pathogens if host death greatly reduces transmission. Vaccines that keep hosts alive but still allow transmission could thus allow very virulent strains to circulate in a population.
Here we show experimentally that immunization of chickens against Marek's disease virus enhances the fitness of more virulent strains, making it possible for hyperpathogenic strains to transmit. Immunity elicited by direct vaccination or by maternal vaccination prolongs host survival but does not prevent infection, viral replication or transmission, thus extending the infectious periods of strains otherwise too lethal to persist.
Our data show that anti-disease vaccines that do not prevent transmission can create conditions that promote the emergence of pathogen strains that cause more severe disease in unvaccinated hosts.
Author Summary
There is a theoretical expectation that some types of vaccines could prompt the evolution of more virulent (“hotter”) pathogens. This idea follows from the notion that natural selection removes pathogen strains that are so “hot” that they kill their hosts and, therefore, themselves. Vaccines that let the hosts survive but do not prevent the spread of the pathogen relax this selection, allowing the evolution of hotter pathogens to occur.
This type of vaccine is often called a leaky vaccine. When vaccines prevent transmission, as is the case for nearly all vaccines used in humans, this type of evolution towards increased virulence is blocked. But when vaccines leak, allowing at least some pathogen transmission, they could create the ecological conditions that would allow hot strains to emerge and persist. This theory proved highly controversial when it was first proposed over a decade ago, but here we report experiments with Marek’s disease virus in poultry that show that modern commercial leaky vaccines can have precisely this effect: they allow the onward transmission of strains otherwise too lethal to persist.
Thus, the use of leaky vaccines can facilitate the evolution of pathogen strains that put unvaccinated hosts at greater risk of severe disease. The future challenge is to identify whether there are other types of vaccines used in animals and humans that might also generate these evolutionary risks.
This study suggests (at least with MDV and its imperfect vaccine) – to paraphrase Nietzsche – that which does not kill the virus, only makes it stronger.
Kai Kupferschmidt, writing for Science Magazine, has an excellent review of this article called Could some vaccines make diseases more deadly?, including reactions from other scientists. Rather than re-invent that wheel, I’ll simply refer my readers to that report, and move on to a related subject.
While above research suggests that imperfect vaccines have have led to the creation of a `hotter’ MVD strains - in the avian flu world we’ve recently seen a rapid rise in the number of novel flu subtypes - which many researchers also attribute to the use of poorly matched, or inconsistently applied vaccines.
Three years ago, we essentially had only one HPAI (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza) virus of real concern; H5N1 – along with a handful of (mostly) low path (LPAI) H5, H7 and H9 viruses.
Since the spring of 2013 we’ve seen multiple new subtypes (H7N9, H10N8, H5N6, H6N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N8, H5N9 (often with multiple clades)) emerge – mostly from China. A new clade of H5N1 (see Eurosurveillance: Emergence Of A Novel Cluster of H5N1 Clade 2.2.1.2) has appeared in Egypt, and that appears to be the driver for their unprecedented surge in human infections.
According to 2012’s Impact of vaccines and vaccination on global control of avian influenza by David Swayne, more than 113 billion poultry vaccine doses were used from 2002 to 2010. Two countries accounted for nearly 96% of all the vaccine used; 1) China (90.9%), 2) Egypt (4.6%).
Despite a decade’s heavy use of HPAI poultry vaccines, both Egypt and China continue to battle frequent outbreaks of HPAI in their poultry, and spillovers into the human population. The chart below is just for H5N1, and does not reflect the 640+ H7N9 cases in China, or the smattering of H5N6, H10N8, and H9N2 infections.
Over the past 8 months roughly 180 Egyptians have contracted H5N1 from contact with infected poultry, and we’ve seen reports of large numbers of poultry outbreaks – even among previously vaccinated poultry (see Egypt H5N1: Poultry Losses Climbing, Prices Up 25%).
Not surprisingly, in 2012’s Egypt: A Paltry Poultry Vaccine, we saw a study conducted by the Virology department at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital that looked at the effectiveness of six commercially available H5 poultry vaccines then deployed in Egypt, and found only one (based on a locally acquired H5N1 seed virus) actually appeared to offer protection.
The reality is, poultry vaccines don’t always prevent disease – sometimes they only mask the symptoms of infection, and that can not only allow viruses to spread stealthily, it can also put human health at risk.
The story in China has been much the same. Last November the EID Journal dispatch Subclinical Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Infection among Vaccinated Chickens, China found evidence to suggest that `imperfect’ vaccines were driving the evolution of new clades, and and the creation of subtypes (bolding mine).
HPAI mass vaccination played a crucial role in HPAI control in China. However, this study demonstrated multiple disadvantages of HPAI mass vaccination, which had been suspected (13,14). For example, this study showed that H5N1 subtype HPAI virus has evolved into multiple H5N2 genotypes, which are all likely vaccine-escape variants, suggesting that this virus can easily evolve into vaccine-escape variants.
This observation suggests that HPAI mass vaccination, which is highly effective in the beginning of an outbreak, may lose its effectiveness with time unless the vaccine strains are updated. Moreover, this study showed that vaccinated chicken flocks can be infected with vaccine-escape variants without signs of illness.
Another study, released in February - Recombinant H5N2 Avian Influenza Virus Strains In Vaccinated Chickens - stated in its cautionary discussion (bolding mine):
In this study, three H5N2 influenza virus strains isolated from chickens were identified as novel reassortants with a highly pathogenic viral genotype. Surprisingly, the affected birds had been vaccinated with killed influenza vaccines but still showed characteristic clinical symptoms of avian influenza and eventually died.
These results are in agreement with previous work indicating that AIVs can continue genetic evolution under vaccination pressure [20]. Moreover, this study highlights the importance and necessity of periodic reformulation of the vaccine strain according to the strains circulating in the field in countries where vaccines are applied to control avian influenza.
Vaccines – even less than perfect ones – are often attractive options to poultry producers and governments facing serious social and economic disruptions from avian flu outbreaks (see Diseases of Food Animals Threaten Global Food Security).
Quarantine and culling – which are the preferred control methods in most of the world – are particularly unattractive options in countries where there are high levels of food insecurity or a high reliance on poultry for income or personal wealth.
For more than a decade, however, the OIE has warned that vaccination of poultry cannot be considered a long-term solution to combating avian flu. And that “Any decision to use vaccination must include an exit strategy, i.e. conditions to be met to stop vaccination”. – OIE on H7N9 Poultry Vaccines.
Despite these warnings, and the diminishing effectiveness of their vaccines these heavily impacted countries appear no closer to looking for that recommended `exit’. The lesson here is that starting a vaccination program is infinitely easier than ending one.
With avian flu threatening to return this fall, many poultry producers in the United States are clamoring for the USDA to approve the use of an HPAI H5 vaccine, something that our government – and indeed most governments around the globe – have so far been reluctant to do.
The most immediate concern is that deploying a bird flu vaccine could seriously impact our poultry exports, as many countries will refuse to accept vaccinated poultry products. This could literally cost the industry billions.
While their are probably situations where limited (and hopefully temporary) use of a poultry vaccine may make sense - the track records of AI poultry vaccine use in China and Egypt show that poultry vaccines haven’t proved to be any sort of panacea for their poultry industry.
Granted, their application may have reduced some short-term economic pain. But after ten years of vaccine use, their bird flu problems only appear to be getting worse.
Meaning there are far more issues for the USDA to weigh this fall when it comes to authorizing a bird flu vaccine for the United States, than just how it might affect exports.
01.47Raden RahmadNo comments
Credit ECDC – Global Export Of MERS – Jul 21st, 2015
UPDATED: 7/28/15 0930 HRS
Crof has a report indicating that both UK: Manchester patients test negative for MERS
# 10,363
Although they have not been confirmed positive yet, earlier today the UK’s NHS announced that two suspected MERS cases had shown up at the Manchester Royal Infirmary A&E, and for the past several hours that department has been closed to the public.
While test results are still pending, and both cases have been placed in isolation, the hospital now reports their A&E is now open.
This afternoon, we confirmed that we are currently investigating two patients for suspected Middle Eastern Respiratory Virus Syndrome - Coronavirus Infection (MERS-COV).
Both patients were isolated for on-going management of their condition while tests took place. One patient has now been relocated to North Manchester General. Results of the tests are still pending.
Manchester Royal Infirmary A&E is open to the public. We would like to reassure our patients and the general public that there is no significant risk to public health.
Whether either one of these two cases end up being confirmed as having the MERS coronavirus (and we should know in the next 12 to 24 hours – updated UK: Manchester patients test negative for MERS), this is a not-so-subtle reminder that someone with an exotic infectious disease - like MERS, avian flu, Ebola, or Lassa fever – can show up at the door to the emergency department of any hospital in the world.
While infection control disasters – like what we saw with MERS in South Korea – are always possible, the good news is we’ve seen most of these types of imported cases quickly contained.
That said, a few weeks ago in Eurosurveillance: Estimating The Odds Of Secondary/Tertiary Cases From An Imported MERS Case, we looked a some modeling that put the odds of seeing at least one secondary case derived from an imported MERS case at 22.7% , while the odds of seeing at least one tertiary case is 10.5%.
Based on their models, however, they calculated the odds of seeing at least 8 cases as the result of a single importation at a non-trivial 10.9%.
Making their interdiction even more difficult, the long incubation period (up to 14 days) and common early symptoms makes detection of infected passengers at the airport a long-shot (see Why Airport Screening Can’t Stop MERS, Ebola or Avian Flu).
In June the CDC released updated guidelines for healthcare providers (see CDC Releases HAN #380 On MERS) and held a COCA Call (see Updated Information & Guidelines For Evaluation Of MERS) to help bring clinicians up to speed on this potential threat. If you haven’t had a chance to listen, you can hear the audio and read the transcript at the link below:
Updated Information and Guidelines for Evaluation for MERS
Overview
On May 20, 2015, the Republic of Korea (Korea) reported to the World Health Organization an initial case of laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infection, the first case in what is now the largest single outbreak of MERS-CoV outside of the Arabian Peninsula. During today’s call, clinicians will be provided information about the global situation and the current status of the MERS-CoV outbreak in the Republic of Korea, updated guidance to healthcare providers and state and local health departments regarding who should be evaluated and tested for MERS-CoV infection, and further guidance on “Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Hospitalized Patients with Possible MERS-CoV.”
Call Materials
- Audio:Listen Now
- Transcript:Read Now
Around the same time APHA (American Public Health Association) weighed in with a summary report (see below) on the CDC's MERS guidelines, along with a handy poster for the public on how they should deal with the MERS threat (much of which would be applicable for almost any infectious disease).
Just over a month ago, in TFAH Issue Brief: Preparing The United States For MERS-CoV & Other Emerging Infections, we looked at the commitments that governments, healthcare facilities, and public health departments around the world need to take in order to prepare for the arrival of MERS and other Emerging infections.
Another complicating factor, in recent weeks we’ve looked at a pair of studies that call into question both the quality of some PPEs (Personal Protective Equipment) used by Health Care Workers, and their techniques in donning and doffing them safely.
Last week’s NIOSH Science Blog: Not All Isolation Gowns Tested Met Standards, found roughly 1/3rd of isolation gowns wanting in some aspect, while a recent APIC study suggests that Most HCWs Are Removing PPEs Improperly.
Whether MERS, Ebola, or Avian flu ever develop into a full fledged global health threat is unknown. At some point, the odds are something will. But for now, we can be grateful that most of the suspected cases will be false alarms and will provide opportunities for HCWs to improve their infection control skills.
The best case scenario is we learn to play this global game of Whac-a-MERS (or Ebola, or H5N1, etc.) exceedingly well, and whenever one of these imported cases pops up, we contain it before it can spread.
But for that to work, every healthcare facility – large and small - needs to plan, train and equip themselves for the possibility that the next patient that comes through the ER entrance could be carrying something considerably more exotic than the flu.
18.21Raden RahmadNo comments
Lower Saxony – Near Dutch Border – Credit Wikipedia
#10,362
Roughly three weeks after the UK reported an outbreak of HPAI H7N7 (see Defra: Lancashire Avian Flu Confirmed As HPAI H7N7), today we learn from the Lower Saxony Ministry of Agriculture of a similar outbreak involving 10,000 layer hens at a farm in Emsland.
While it has been HPAI H5 avian flu viruses that have captured the bulk of our attention over the past dozen years, in the `also ran’ category are a growing variety of both low and high path H7 viruses. Until the emergence of H7N9 in China in 2013 – and the resultant infections (and in some cases, deaths) of hundreds of people – H7 viruses as a group were considered a low threat to public health.
China’s emerging H7N9 virus is a reminder that one should not get too comfortable with the track record of any flu subtype, as past performance is no guarantee of future results.
For now, however, H7 viruses other than China’s H7N9 are considered to pose a low threat to human health, as nearly all reported infections have been mild – often producing little more than conjunctivitis (see ECDC Update & Assessment: Human Infection By Avian H7N7 In Italy).
H7’s , however, are considered a serious threat to the poultry industry, and have caused hundred of millions of dollars in losses over the years.
There are two broad categories of avian influenza; LPAI (Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza) and HPAI (Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza).
This statement from the http://www.niedersachsen.de website.
(machine translation)
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7 in the Emsland district
Investigations in LAVES and FLI confirm the self-check-result
HANNOVER. In Emsland the highly pathogenic form of bird flu has been found in a herd of hens. Affected is a company with about 10,000 laying hens in floor management that have been humanely killed. Suspected bird flu had resulted from self-monitoring results, which have now been confirmed by official samples of LAVES. In addition, it is clear, according to studies in the national reference laboratory of the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute (FLI) on the island Riems, that it was the highly pathogenic form of avian influenza (HPAI) is with subtype H7N7.
Experience has shown that it appears to come from animals to humans only in close contact with diseased or dead birds and their products or excretions of transmitting viruses. One should avoid direct contact with infected animals so sure. All necessary measures to combat the disease are set by European and federal regulations by the Emsland district Based on the official result. At the outbreak of highly pathogenic influenza form they relate, inter alia, the establishment of a Sperrbezirkes with three kilometers radius around the outbreak and operation of a monitoring area with a radius of ten kilometers. Poultry shall not be moved from these areas out in these areas or screwing in. Within a radius of one kilometer around the affected operating stocks are also animal welfare compliant killed - in this case about 60 animals from two animal facilities.
In addition, epidemiological investigation be undertaken to determine the cause and other contact holdings. Shall take effect 30 days after cleansing and disinfection operation no new case, these measures can be lifted. In Lower Saxony, outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza type H5N8 December 2014 were observed in the district of Cloppenburg and in the Emsland district recently. In March and in June this year, there was in the district of Cuxhaven and in the Emsland district outbreaks of low pathogenic form of avian influenza type H7N7.
For years, it comes again and again to the world outbreaks. With nearly 50 million so far this year were affected animals in particular the United States affected by severe HPAI cases. HPAI caused by avian influenza viruses, of which there are a variety of subtypes. An entry in domestic poultry is usually indirectly via virus-contaminated people and vehicles or excretions. In stock transfer is usually directly from animal to animal.
In Germany, regular monitoring tests for avian influenza in poultry flocks and in wild birds will be held. These have so far found no evidence of an influenza occurrence in Lower Saxony. Moreover, there is in poultry flocks special control inspections. All poultry farmers are urged to check their bio-security measures and apply them consistently. More information is available at www.tierseucheninfo.niedersachsen.de be viewed.
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